This PR's author says there on October 1st: "Got an email from Oracle asking me to NOT proceed with a PR until receiving approval." and then on October 28th: "It's taken over by Oracle. Nothing required from us."
I don't think that's a reasonable implication at all.
There are lots of bugs in lots of software, and lots of them get ignored when reported.
I personally aware of multiple security vulnerabilities in major pieces of software that everyone has heard of, which I very quickly and easily stumbled on while working on this software as an AWS engineer several years ago. I had never used an LLM of any kind at the time.
I presented my findings both internally and externally, and the reactions ranged from shrugs to delays to hostility towards me for "getting distracted" or "being overly negative."
Those bugs that I discovered still exist, last time I checked.
Why it was closed, surely, was because the only reaction to the PR was a bot saying it will automatically close the PR soon because of inactivity?
I know I have opened a lot of PRs where the only result is I get bot spam in my email and no project reaction, so I close the PR to stop the bot spam; if nobody from Oracle has reacted in 2 months it seems unlikely anyone will.
Nowadays I’ve stopped opening “cold-call” PRs like this. I find a way to chat with a maintainer first and anchor what I want to do (“I hit this bug, would you take a PR to fix it? I was thinking it could be solved by x, would that work?”
I'd be surprised if that's what happened. The instant I see "corrupting the heap" I assume it's a serious vulnerability unless proven otherwise. AI is taking it to another level, but the days of dismissing memory corruption as unexploitable died years before.
From califio: "I focused the audit on the JIT compiler, intrinsics, widely accessible APIs, and cryptography. Well, more precisely, I told Codex to look at those areas like any serious security researcher in 2026."
Maybe simply a coincidence, but I would put my bets that the first person with the PR was also using Codex, and the model was exposed to the details of the bug.
> From califio: "I focused the audit on the JIT compiler, intrinsics, widely accessible APIs, and cryptography. Well, more precisely, I told Codex to look at those areas like any serious security researcher in 2026."
I have no idea why people keep talking like this. Probably because sadly most engineers lack the ego to back themselves up. Imagine if someone said this in 2015:
"I worked on the physics engine, tests, via widely accessible libraries. Well, more precisely, I told my compiler to read the source code and compile it like any serious software engineer in 2026."
Quit saying Codex/Claude/an LLM did something. They didn't. You did.
"I worked on the physics engine, tests, via widely accessible libraries." is a nonsensical sentence as written, but a colleague who told me they had done this would be telling me a vastly different thing to if they had told me they had compiled the source code to a physics engine.
There is a massive difference between prompting "security audit this codebase, make no mistakes", performing an in-depth agent or LLM-assisted focused search for security relevant code, or otherwise manually reviewing code as we did in the pre-LLM era. It behooves us to be honest about our own personal contribution to our output - both towards others and to ourselves.
I don't disagree with you necessarily, and I do think it a good practice to disclose how much of a contribution was llm generated, but regarding the difference an individual makes, I see a huge gap between different colleagues in how well they are able to use llms and the quality of the results they are able to produce with them, so I am increasingly inclined to view them as something closer to a compiler or SMT solver than a contributor in of themselves.
> Quit saying Codex/Claude/an LLM did something. They didn't. You did.
I think there's a vast difference between giving source code to a compiler (even a superoptimizing compiler) and giving a prompt to a language model. This distinction absolutely deserves to be called out and not swept under the rug. It doesn't make you any less responsible for what you submit, but it's courteous to your reviewers to be transparent.
Is it really fair to say that I did something when my contribution was typing straightforward English prose for thirty seconds and then letting it run?
Your hypothetical makes the opposite point from what you intend. If someone in 2015 said that they worked on a physics engine, and all they did was run the compiler on existing code, we'd laugh them out of the room. Pointing an existing computer program at existing work doesn't count as doing very much.
A frontier AI is nothing like a compiler. The litmus test is how much expertise was required to get it to find the results. If a basic prompt brings up an industry-shaking vulnerability of this caliber, then the human was at best a janitor.
They closed themselves immediately after the stale bot pinged to say it was going to be closed automatically. If you're not that investigated in a PR for a niche corruption bug, you open it and nobody responds for two months, when you get notified about it it's pretty reasonable to just close and move on. Perfectly normal OSS contributor behaviour imo (especially in this new world where every project is drowning under AI contributions, and struggling to stay responsive).
Why should someone discovering a bug in an enormously complex piece of software have any responsibility for assessing the security implications of that bug?
If the maintainers wanted to make it private they could have done so.
The bot auto-closes issues that have been inactive for 16 weeks. The CVE was published at about 10 weeks in. The auto-close bot was completely irrelevant to this. The issue wasn't that it got auto-closed (it didn't) but that nobody from the project looked at the PR. That's a hard problem to solve, because any big project has a lot of volume and it's easy to miss things. It's unfortunate but a fact of life that you can't just toss up a PR and expect anyone to automatically look at it.
Even Duke gave up on the current state of software.
Would it be better to have some Oracle gpus running the dukebot? Are the robobun and friends better at real triage/escalation? Could we automate the robobots to register the `java2root.com` domain on its own, release a blog post and post it in twitter/hn upon every successful security issue?
Except that in Base64 it’s not the alternating bit pattern of hex A (binary 0101), which is the property one uses it for in memory, but instead decodes to all-zeros (and is binary 01000001 in ASCII before decoding).
This PR's author says there on October 1st: "Got an email from Oracle asking me to NOT proceed with a PR until receiving approval." and then on October 28th: "It's taken over by Oracle. Nothing required from us."
There are lots of bugs in lots of software, and lots of them get ignored when reported.
I personally aware of multiple security vulnerabilities in major pieces of software that everyone has heard of, which I very quickly and easily stumbled on while working on this software as an AWS engineer several years ago. I had never used an LLM of any kind at the time.
I presented my findings both internally and externally, and the reactions ranged from shrugs to delays to hostility towards me for "getting distracted" or "being overly negative."
Those bugs that I discovered still exist, last time I checked.
- why was this not a secure vulnerability report, why was it public?
- why was this closed [by the submitter]?
For the second question, I suspect it's because they were told a different fix was coming.
I know I have opened a lot of PRs where the only result is I get bot spam in my email and no project reaction, so I close the PR to stop the bot spam; if nobody from Oracle has reacted in 2 months it seems unlikely anyone will.
Nowadays I’ve stopped opening “cold-call” PRs like this. I find a way to chat with a maintainer first and anchor what I want to do (“I hit this bug, would you take a PR to fix it? I was thinking it could be solved by x, would that work?”
Much much better outcomes that way.
Because it was seen as a crash not an RCE. AI's power has been chaining simple crashes into exploits. But that's not generally going to be true.
Nonetheless, being able to understand the criticality of a finding, and how to exploit it are other skills, that still require supervision.
Maybe simply a coincidence, but I would put my bets that the first person with the PR was also using Codex, and the model was exposed to the details of the bug.
I have no idea why people keep talking like this. Probably because sadly most engineers lack the ego to back themselves up. Imagine if someone said this in 2015: "I worked on the physics engine, tests, via widely accessible libraries. Well, more precisely, I told my compiler to read the source code and compile it like any serious software engineer in 2026."
Quit saying Codex/Claude/an LLM did something. They didn't. You did.
There is a massive difference between prompting "security audit this codebase, make no mistakes", performing an in-depth agent or LLM-assisted focused search for security relevant code, or otherwise manually reviewing code as we did in the pre-LLM era. It behooves us to be honest about our own personal contribution to our output - both towards others and to ourselves.
I think there's a vast difference between giving source code to a compiler (even a superoptimizing compiler) and giving a prompt to a language model. This distinction absolutely deserves to be called out and not swept under the rug. It doesn't make you any less responsible for what you submit, but it's courteous to your reviewers to be transparent.
Your hypothetical makes the opposite point from what you intend. If someone in 2015 said that they worked on a physics engine, and all they did was run the compiler on existing code, we'd laugh them out of the room. Pointing an existing computer program at existing work doesn't count as doing very much.
It was literal bug with provided fix. All it needed is someone to have a proper look.
But someone clowned a bot under a visionary thought "if nobody looked it must not be important" and here we are
Why invest more time to close it? The automation will do it for you.
Sorry, but why?
Why should someone discovering a bug in an enormously complex piece of software have any responsibility for assessing the security implications of that bug?
If the maintainers wanted to make it private they could have done so.
Except soon you can expect LLM triage to be standard.
We would then find out if enough tokens would be invested in this one to figure out it was important, but any look is better than none.
Would it be better to have some Oracle gpus running the dukebot? Are the robobun and friends better at real triage/escalation? Could we automate the robobots to register the `java2root.com` domain on its own, release a blog post and post it in twitter/hn upon every successful security issue?
You might follow up with a De Bruijn/cyclic pattern and can see the overflow happen by step1 and precisely locate it by what replaces the A's.
https://youtu.be/L2j90atBpRU?is=q6W_1eF4viMoKZEA
Didn't the Alpine Linux bug also use A's for the exploit to login as root?