The FCC maintains a list of equipment and services (Covered List)
that have been determined to “pose an unacceptable risk to the
national security
Recently, malicious state and non-state sponsored cyber attackers
have increasingly leveraged the vulnerabilities in small and home
office routers produced abroad to carry out direct attacks against
American civilians in their homes.
Vulnerabilities have nothing to do with country of manufacture. They have always been due to manufacturers' crap security practices. Security experts have been trying to call attention to this problem for 2 decades.
Manufacturers have never had to care about security because no Gov agency would ever mandate secure firmware. This includes the FCC which license their devices and the FTC who (until recently) had the direct mandate to protect consumers.
Our most recent step backward was to gut those agencies of any ability to provide consumer oversight. All they they can do now is craft protectionist policies that favor campaign donors.
The US has a bazillion devices with crap security because we set ourselves up for this.
> Manufacturers have never had to care about security because no Gov agency would ever mandate secure firmware.
The problem is that "secure firmware" is a relativistic statement. You ship something with no known bugs and then someone finds one.
What you need is not a government mandate for infallibility, it's updates. But then vendors want to stop issuing them after 3 years, meanwhile many consumers will keep using the device for 15. And "require longer support" doesn't fix it because many of the vendors will go out of business.
What you need is the ability for consumers to replace the firmware.
That solves the problem in three ways. First, when the company goes out of business you can still put a supported third party firmware on the device. Second, you can do that immediately, because the open source firmwares have a better security record than the OEMs to begin with. And third, then the device is running a widely used open source firmware instead of a custom device-specific proprietary black box, which makes it easier for the government or anyone else who is so inclined to find vulnerabilities and patch them.
> But then vendors want to stop issuing them after 3 years
Tough shit. You provide updates for the mandated amount of time, or you lose access to the market. No warnings, you're just done.
> And "require longer support" doesn't fix it because many of the vendors will go out of business.
Source code escrow plus a bond. The bond is set at a level where a third party can pay engineers to maintain the software and distribute updates for the remainder of the mandated support period. And as time passes with documented active support, the bond requirements for that device go down until the end of the support period.
Requiring that the customer be allowed to replace the firmware is essential, I agree, but not for this reason. That requirement, by itself, just externalizes the support costs onto open source communities. Companies that sell this sort of hardware need to put up the resources, up front, irrevocably, to ensure the cost of software maintenance is covered for the entire period.
Personally I don't buy consumer router hardware that I can't immediately flash OpenWRT on, but that option is not suitable for the general public.
> What you need is the ability for consumers to replace the firmware.
I don't think that's enough. Most people aren't going to replace the firmware on their device with an open source replacement made by someone else. Now if the firmware was required to be open source, and automatic updates could be seamlessly switched over to a non-profit or government agency in the event of the company going out of business, you might have something. But there would be a lot of details to work out.
The concept of community firmware seems like a huge cop-out that allows companies to externalize costs. And it probably won't help security because 99% of devices will never get the third-party firmware installed anyway.
If they were trying to save costs they would ship the community firmware on the device to begin with because then they wouldn't have to write and maintain their own. The community welcomes them to externalize those costs onto the people with better incentives to improve the software.
What they're actually trying to do is obsolete the devices faster because then they won't add new protocols or other software-only features to older devices so you have to buy a new one, or only expose features in more expensive models that the less expensive hardware would also be capable of doing. Which is all the more reason for us to not have that.
And if they were required to allow anyone to replace the firmware then you would get companies reflashing and selling them that way from the store because the free firmware has more advertisable features. There's a reason you can go to major PC OEMs and pick between Windows, Linux and "don't even install one" and the reason is that if you give customers a choice, they generally don't want their software to be made by the OEM.
It could be part of dissolution of the company to mandate community firmware. But it depends on their licenses…
Anyhow, this is a common enough practice. Many companies that provide infrastructure type software and sell to Fortune 500 companies often have a clause whereby they deliver their software to their customers if the shut down.
We don't care about their licenses; that's their problem. If they need firmware with a license that allows them to redistribute it there are plenty of free ones to choose from.
And you can't wait until after they're dead to have them do something. By then they're gone or judgment proof because they're already bankrupt. Especially when you're talking about companies that aren't in the jurisdiction because you can't even make them do anything when they're already not shipping products to you anymore. It has to be from Day 1.
There was a promising design from Azure Sphere for 10 years of IoT device Linux security updates from Microsoft, even if the IoT vendor went out of business. This required a hardware design to isolate vendor userspace code from device security code, so they could be updated independently. Could be resurrected as open standard with FRAND licensing.
The main thing you need is for the lowest-level code to be open and replaceable/patchable because it's the only part which is actually specific to the device. Windows running on Core Boot is a better place to be than custom Linux running on opaque blob, because in the first case you can pretty easily get to newer Windows, vanilla Linux or anything else you want running on Core Boot after the original version of Windows goes out of support, and you can update Core Boot, whereas the latter often can't even get you to a newer version of Linux.
Modern coreboot depends on opaque blobs on CPU (FSP/ACM on Intel) and auxiliary processors (ME/PSP), but AMD is moving in the right direction with OpenSIL host firmware. Arm devices have their own share of firmware blobs.
A decade of security updates for routers would require stable isolation between low-level device security and IoT vendor userspace. In Sphere, the business model for 10 years of paid updates was backed by hardware isolation. Anyone know why it didn't get market traction? There was a dev board, but no products shipped.
> What you need is the ability for consumers to replace the firmware.
> That solves the problem in three ways.
That alleviates the problem, but definitely doesn't solve it. Updates are still required, and most people will never update devices they don't directly interact with.
How? The device phones home to the manufacturer's servers to get new updates. Manufacturer goes out of business, servers get shut down. How does it know where to get updates now?
Which introduces new security risks, but more importantly, the consumer has to configure the device to use open source firmware, and set up auto updates, unless the device is being auto updated by the device manufacturer and forces all of their customers to switch to the new firmware, which seems very unlikely.
Somebody has to pay for the support. There is no free meal.
Enterprise must be able to pay for support for as long as they use devices. Solved.
I can only think of requiring the devices to be serviceable, as you say. The absolute only way I can think of charging the consumers, ie the owners, is to charge a tax on internet connections. Then the government would pay somehow vulnerability hunters working along patchers, who can oversee each other.
Consumers are tricky: if you include support in the sale price, the company will grab the money and run in 3 or 5 years; and some companies will sell cheaper because they know they won't provide support.
> Somebody has to pay for the support. There is no free meal.
The problem is not that people need a free meal. The problem is that people need the ability to eat some other food when the OEM's restaurant is closed or unsatisfactory.
I mean, OEM would make the device upgradeable, government will pay independent bounty hunters and patchers and will push the updates. Then consumers pay for all that.
"You ship something with no known bugs and then someone finds one."
You managed to say that with a straight face!
Let's keep this ... non partisan. You might recall that many vendors have decided to embed static creds in firmware and only bother patch them out when caught out.
How on earth is embedded creds in any way: "no known bugs"?
I think we are on the same side (absolutely) but please don't allow the buggers any credibility!
> How on earth is embedded creds in any way: "no known bugs"?
You misunderstand how organizational knowledge works. You see, it doesn't.
Some embeds the credentials, someone else ships the product. The first person doesn't even necessarily still work there at that point.
Remember that time NASA sent a Mars orbiter to Mars and then immediately crashed it because some of them were using pounds and the others newtons? Literally rocket scientists.
The best we know how to do here is to keep the incentives aligned so the people who suffer the consequences of something can do something about it. And in this case the people who suffer the consequences are the consumers, not the company that may have already ceased to exist, so we need to give the consumers a good way to fix it.
> Secure software won't protect you from insecure hardware
Then what's KPTI etc.?
> which also needs to be formally verified for a secure system.
Now we just need a correct and complete theory of quantum mechanics and to do something about that Heisenberg thing.
In general formal proofs tell you if something is true given a stipulated set of assumptions. They don't tell you if one of the stipulated assumptions is wrong or can be caused to be wrong on purpose by doing something nobody had previously known to be possible.
Plenty of consumer-grade devices have had very lax security settings or backdoors baked in for purposes of “troubleshooting” and recovery assistance. It’s never been limited to foreign-made devices.
Security has never been part of the review process. The only time any agency has really cared is when encryption is involved, and that’s just been the FBI wanting it to be neutered so they can have their own backdoors.
> This includes the FCC which license their devices
The FCC licenses devices to the extent that devices can cause spurious transmissions in the radio spectrum. It’s not a general consumer protection agency. Computer security also is outside the mandate of the FTC, which exists to protect consumers from anticompetitive conduct and unfair business practices, not crappy products.
I could see why someone might be confused in the Mayer of what the FCC can regulate, considering that it regulates the content of television and radio broadcasts and somehow regulates cable TV providers, despite the use of wired connections to customers, instead of radio transmissions.
So if a company uses as part of its marketing for a product the phrase "advanced security, privacy, and connectivity for homes of every shape and size" and then is later found to have lied about the "advanced security" and "privacy" part of their marketing by shipping firmware with security bugs, does that not now fall under the "deceptive" category of the "unfair, deceptive and fraudulent business practices" part of the FTC's mission?
Sounds like it does to me. Also you're forgetting the part where the FTC under a prior administration either banned DLINK from selling in the US or heavily fined them for selling routers in the US that they knew were running insecure, buggy firmware.
(both quotes were taken verbatim from first, Netgear's US website, and secondly the Bureau of Consumer Protections' section of the FTC's website)
I know it's the norm to criticize the admin, but I don't think its what they're saying. I think they're saying "they know of the vulns they leave in and only fix them after it's been exploited by their states".
Not that any consumer router is super nice and safe, honestly, you're better off making your own these days.
IMO they should have a choice between open source that can be updated out of band from the manufacturer or assuming direct liability for issues for the product's life.
> Vulnerabilities have nothing to do with country of manufacture. They have always been due to manufacturers' crap security practices.
Sorry but this is merely a convenient excuse. Source: I have hard evidence of a Chinese IoT device where crap security practices were later leveraged by the same company to inject exploit code. It's called plausible deniability and it's foolish to tell me it's a coincidence.
You're not going to convince me that a foreign state actor pressuring a company to include a backdoor wouldn't disguise it as a "whoopsie, our crap code lol" as opposed to adding in the open with a disclaimer on it.
It's all closed source firmware. Even the GPL packages from most consumer router vendors are loaded with binary blobs. Tell me I should trust it.
If US manufacturers (or manufacturers in allied countries) do this, legal avenues exist to hold those manufacturers accountable. Not so with China.
(That is not to say that the FCC change will move the needle on the underlying issue of router security; as some of the ancestor comments have said, lax security practices are common industry-wide, irrespective of country of development/manufacture.)
The Snowden leak showed that Cisco routers had been altered to enable surveillance [1]. Whether or not the manufacturer is complicit, or how the alteration is performed is ultimately irrelevant to the end user. Ultimately, the only people that got in legal trouble for this were Snowden and people who provided service to him.
And who hasn't seen American software companies where crap security practices are later leveraged by the same company to run exploits? It's of course always phrased in Orwellian terms of business practices, terms of service, "security", etc but we can still call a spade a spade.
This part of the press release seems pretty crucial:
> Producers of consumer-grade routers that receive Conditional Approval from DoW or DHS can continue to receive FCC equipment authorizations.
In other words, foreign-made consumer routers are banned by default. But if you are a manufacturer, you can apply to get unbanned ("Conditional Approval").
If you (a manufacturer) apply, they want information regarding corporate location, jursidiction, and ownership. They want a bill of materials with country of origin and a justification for why any foreign-sourced components can't be domestic. They want information about who provides software and updates. And they want to hear your plan to increase US domestic manufacturing and progress toward that goal.
So, foreign-made consumer routers can still be sold, but they are going to look at them with a fine-tooth comb, and they are going to use FCC approval as leverage to try to increase domestic manufacturing.
> foreign-made consumer routers can still be sold, but they are going to look at them with a fine-tooth comb, and they are going to use FCC approval as leverage to try to increase domestic manufacturing
That is not what's going to happen. What's going to happen is that anyone coughing up payola to the current executive in chief's people will get approved, and anyone that doesn't will remain blocked. This practice is currently widespread, in the form of tariffs.
We're going to keep seeing this in all kinds of industries throughout the next three or so years: "Your products are banned or your country is tariffed, but if you pay enough in bribes, er I mean undergo our approval process, then you'll be exempt."
That descriptions already fits the payola model. It's almost never about directly handing money to a politician. That's illegal, so it's not worth doing when there's legal ways to do it. Instead, payola usually involves regulations requiring using some kind of product or certification, then the organizations that sell the product or perform the certification contribute to the politicians.
Also, the biggest benefactors of payola aren't the politicians, it's the rent seekers, that is the businesses already in place that want to prevent competition. Because of this, they usually directly contribute to the politicians that promise to restrict the path to doing business.
For example, if you want a newest-generation extremely-efficient air conditioner in the US, you won't be able to buy it and even if you could, you wouldn't be able to get anyone to install it. Any given model of air conditioners needs to be on an approved list to be sold in the US, and the installer needs to be on an approved list, too. This means that by the time an air conditioner makes it onto the list, it's already old. Also, installers can require you buy it from them, and almost all do, so by the time time an installer on the list has it for sale, it's even older than that. Ironically this is all enabled by the EPA, on the auspices that they are ensuring that it's energy inefficient, when in reality they are preserving the market for the older, more expensive, and inefficient models.
Trump made $4B last year. It's open and direct bribery at this point. He's said he plans to hide behind qualified immunity and pardons for people he pays (with tax money) to break the law on his behalf.
Dario (CEO of Anthropic) said the DoW contract violations and threats were direct retaliation for not paying Trump "campaign" money. Later, he was forced to apologize for speaking the truth.
> If you (a manufacturer) apply, they want information regarding corporate location, jursidiction, and ownership. They want a bill of materials with country of origin and a justification for why any foreign-sourced components can't be domestic. They want information about who provides software and updates. And they want to hear your plan to increase US domestic manufacturing and progress toward that goal.
Wow NGL this sounds great if you ignore the reality that it'll be used as a partisan backdoor to enriching the administration.
> So, foreign-made consumer routers can still be sold, but they are going to look at them with a fine-tooth comb, and they are going to use FCC approval as leverage to try to increase domestic manufacturing.
You're assuming a non-partisan technocratic process, which this administration has amply shown is neither capable nor willing to provide. This requirement becomes another opportunity for Pay-to-Play, either in cash or quid pro quo, to the government directly (see, e.g., NVidia and AMD export allowances) or to Trump's inner circle (see, e.g., crypto venture regulation, merger approvals).
This is the problem with erosion of norms. We’ve all known for decades that consumer routers have shit security. We’ve all known about the risk of implants or intentional backdoors in the supply chain. And now when the FCC appears to be finally doing something about it, there’s a massive cloud of mistrust hanging over the whole idea.
The mistrust comes from those doing it, and the clearly corrupt ways they are operating. The maggot movement is basically rooted in a lot of very real frustrations from very real longstanding problems, but the only thing it offers as solutions is performative vice signalling.
People who care about the problems of digital security are not going to lean into the idea of simply banning devices based on where they were manufactured. Rather they would work at general standards and solutions to actually solve the problems - things like untying the markets for hardware/firmware/services, requiring firmware source escrow, mandating LAN protocols and controllers so every single IoT device isn't backhauling to its own mothership, and so on.
Likewise people who care about domestic manufacturing first and foremost are not going to champion applying steep blanket tariffs two decades after all of that industry has already left, or using regulatory agencies to shake down manufacturers for unrelated concessions.
I’m reading this as “tariffs didn’t work, so now we need different pain levers to wield against trading partners to bully them at the expense of consumers”.
Any router made by a company that "donates" (bribes) to Trump's "ballroom" or other vanity projects will get approved. Irrespective of anything else. This is just another grift.
The business model is simple: Sell nice hardware at a premium, then sponsor and upstream improvements to OpenWRT.
If the software is an important differentiator (arguably, it is for things like Ubiquiti, but clearly it is not for most consumer routers), then release the patches under the Business Source License with a 3-5 year sunset back to BSD / Apache / GPL.
Open to audits doesn't mean free software, it just means visible source. The business model for selling routers with auditable firmware is selling routers.
I'm no fan of imaginary property, but you're going to have to lay out your reasoning here. Firmware security is such crap precisely because most hardware manufacturers see it as nothing but a cost center they wish they could avoid.
The difficulty of installing OpenWRT or Linux in general on hardware comes from that hardware not being documented, or not having straightforward APIs like BIOS/EFI.
Or for some devices, community distributions that dubiously remix manufacturer-supplied binaries are available. But we generally see that as soon as the manufacturer stops their updates, the community versions start lagging behind as well.
You will first probably need Congress to legislate away the long standing prohibitions against offering (easily) user-modifiable RF devices on the market.
Self ownership and full 'right to repair' has carve-outs in the FCC's regulations in the name of limiting unintentional broadcasting/radiation. Maybe a challenge to those would survive in the post-Chevron environment. I wouldn't expect any Congress in the last 25 years to pass a law which would go against the incumbent telecom lobbyist interests though, and I'd expect such a hole if it did hit case law, to get 'patched' fairly quickly.
About the only way to really solve that would be to embarrass vendors enough to open their moats.
I dunno, I'm pretty big on FOSS but I don't think you would need that to improve. Requiring that the firmware have its source code available to audit doesn't mean that users can replace it. AFAIK you could, today, with no legal changes, have a vendor release 100% of the code under eg. a MIT license while also making the device refuse to run firmware not signed with their keys. Researchers could poke at it to find bugs, and FCC regulations wouldn't be touched. (Note: IANAL, so feel free to point out if I'm wrong about that)
(To be clear, I don't think that's good enough; at a minimum I think there should be a wifi card that does refuse modifications and a main application processor that is 100% user controlled so that they can actually fix problems without needing the vendor to help, but I think it's useful to point out that auditing code doesn't require being able to install it)
problem is: how do you prove the firmware in the flash chip matches source? And I do not mean me, with a disassembler and a pi pico to read out the flash chip. I mean the 70-yaer-old corner shop owner that buys this router to provide free WiFi for customers?
Yes. But a lot of people still got cars that were not as represented. So if we follow the same pattern, somebody will go to jail, but most routers will not be running verified or safe code.
A trusted website that compiles it from source and a way for you to go to a webpage and flash from there automatically. The FPV community does that all the time with a set of websites for their ESC, flight controllers, radio, all open source. You can add signatures etc but just a trusted website goes a long way vs a random blob preinstalled
That proves that the one they checked, had the correct firmware. It does not prove that the one from the next batch that you bought did. We are all technical people here we and understand that there isn’t really an easy way to do this that a random non-technical person could actually understand and use.
Isn't the person you're replying to suggesting people can update the firmware to the trusted version via a website? So it doesn't matter if you get one from 'the next batch' - provided you're on top of updating the firmware.
If only somebody could make a firmware that claims to have accepted the update, but then proceeds to not actually update itself. Read out the version string from the update and save it. Show that when asked what your version is.
There's no solution to that other than having knowledge and researching the code/device yourself. You can pick apart modern Linux/busybox based IoTs fairly quickly, so effort needed is not really a huge issue.
Maybe trusted community of people could do it for everyone, but there's currently all kinds of potential legal trouble brewing in that approach. Complete and public reverse engineering of every aspect of any device would have to be made completely legal, so that people could freely publish all artifacts extracted from a device and produced during reverse engineering and collaborate on them without any fear of repercussions. Also HW manufacturers would have to be prohibited from NDAing documentation for SoCs, etc.
Side benefit would be that this would also serve as a documentation for freeing the device and developing alternative firmwares with modernized sw/reduced attack surface.
We are in violent agreement. And precisely because there is no simple solution to it, half-measures like what is proposed here do absolutely no good, and often times do harm.
Considering this is after Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024), it will be interesting to see if this holds up to judicial scrutiny.
The FCC's power just got substantially nerfed, and "we've decided to slow lane all foreign-made routers" feels like that may have been beaten on the old, higher, standard. Let alone the new one that gives the FCC almost no power.
> As outlined below, today’s action does not impact a consumer’s continued use of routers they previously acquired. Nor does it prevent retailers from continuing to sell, import, or market router models approved previously through the FCC’s equipment authorization process. By operation of the FCC’s Covered List rules, the restrictions imposed today apply to new device models.
I’m sure plenty of US factories are capable of importing boxes that look like routers but are actually just switches (because the router firmware is missing) and re-flashing them here…
For the device manufacturers, the obvious solution is to sell them as general-purpose computers. You can already get devices that had started out as Raspberry Pi clones but evolved into excellent DIY network appliances, with multiple high-speed Ethernet and SSD ports that are great for running a NAS, proxy server, firewall, or all three, and more. Rarely do they have good WiFi, but if manufacturers start selling hardware that has been traditionally sold as a locked-down routers or access points, but include a generic Linux installation, it'll compete will well with the aforementioned hardware.
Companies want to sell what consumers want to buy. But the average consumer doesn't want a general-purpose computer for this job; they instead want to buy a "router".
If companies market the devices as something other than "routers" then consumers will not buy them for routing duty.
(Meanwhile, the non-average people who want to use general-purpose computers as homespun router/NAS/do-all boxes are already aware of how this all works...and many of us have been doing it this way for decades. (Often, this happens alongside dedicated access points that do have good wifi radios.))
The average consumer doesn't want a router full stop. Their ISP hands them an all-in-one modem+router+switch+WAP box and they just accept that the internet lives inside of it.
I have roommates who are engineers and I had to explain to them the difference between Wi-fi access point and LAN when I replaces our wireless router with a router + 3 APs.
> But the average consumer doesn't want a general-purpose computer for this job; they instead want to buy a "router".
So start your own company called usa router co, and sell some random arm board with a preinstalled router image... the end user won't know the difference.
Oh, for sure. That's easy enough; it's what GL.inet does: They sell router-shaped computers that run a skinned openwrt -- out of the box. (There's been some questions about GPL compliance over the years, but that's a separate issue.)
And superficially, it sounds like a straight-forward thing for me or anyone else to do here in the states, but things get murky quickly: What differentiates a foreign-made router from a US-made router?
Can I get some flunky push the button in his studio apartment in Idaho to flash open (but globally-sourced!) firmware onto some boxes from Alibaba (in exchange for startup promises) and call that good enough?
Do I have to spin up the boards here in the States? And the ICs, too? How about the passive jelly-bean parts like the capacitors and resistors and the antennas?
What of the rest of the device? Like, things such as the housing, the packaging, the power supply, and the included ethernet cable: Do I need to source those from domestic US production or is it OK if they're foreign-made components?
Do I have to produce the software in the States? (If so, Linux is right out.)
"Will turn off"... are you claiming that consumer-grade routers have a secret backdoor kill switch that one government or another can use to turn them off? That's a little hard to believe (even when they are security Swiss cheese).
Seeing the operational capability of Mossad in Iran means if desired, one should assume the US and China are equally capable.
The US didn’t make a space force to please the ego, it was likely to occur eventually. They aren’t spending all their time wargaming a moon invasion lol
Logistically, hacking tons of different model routers is not feasible. It would be more useful to yank the power grid.. which can be accomplished with missiles or software.
I'm not sure what you're suggesting, exactly, but we seem to have escalated from "kill the consumer-grade WiFi routers" to "kill the entire US power grid" in one post? If anyone did that, with missiles or software, things are going to escalate very quickly from there.
What exactly does "produced" mean in this context? That the final assembly was done here, software was written here, PCB was assembled here, SoCs and ICs wwre manufactured here, or something else? Regardless, while consumer routers are 9 of 10 times insecure garbage, it's hard to think of any that aren't manufactured outside the US.
my instinct is open source is part of the answer. the market monetizes with differentiation on the open source base, support, hardware, etc. vibrant enough market = the foss is secure (always a relative term) and continues to evolve, partially paid for by the companies who are monetizing
I would be more impressed if they would ban all enterprise routers manufactured in China. I have had to continuously patch and meticulously mitigate severe vulnerabilities and bugs in Cisco, Dell, HPE, Extreme, Arista routers, switches, fabrics, and others. These are all manufactured in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and probably elsewhere in the Greater China region... Actually I take it all back. I wish they would just ban companies from shipping bad code and sanction them for causing millions of hours of required labor to ensure their manufacturing defects do not harm businesses and their customers. Thank you for your attention to my chatter.
Prediction: there will appear new "Made in the USA" routers that differ from some Chinese model only by the label. Already the case in Russia for e.g. powerbanks.
It's hard to tell considering there is absolutely no company/ownership information on the site, but a .si (Slovenia) domain coupled with EUR being an accepted currency has me thinking they're Europe-based, and therefore foreign-made.
... at the same time, I don't think I'd send $100 to a site with no contact/ownership/company info to begin with.
Because of this, I'm going to plan my next network upgrade based on open source hardware like Banana Pi. My setup is based on WiFi 7 so this might not apply for a few years. From my understanding, the hardware from proprietary manufacturers is sufficiently advanced to do some advanced surveillance and spyware, whereas previous generations didn't require advanced processing to achieve fiber optic speeds. Back to the original statement, it's clear that the threat of surveillance exists.
Personally, I don't make the distinction between foreign and domestically produced routers in America. In fact, I trust foreign produced routers more because the likelihood that they can act upon their surveillance is significantly lower than the current American regime's oppressive and malicious tactics. Therefore, open source routers provides enough transparency to effectively eliminate spyware threats from all angles while being compliant.
I'm especially excited about the Banana Pi because of the transparency and potential of modular upgrades. Whenever there's a network issue, I have to consider whether the manufacturer (American or not) is doing something nefarious. With a Pi based router, I have much more peace of mind with network debugging issues.
IMHO an underrated comment. The CCP isn't going to break down my door in the middle of the night, but I'm sure I'm on lists at the FBI and ATF just for my political org memberships alone. I think a foreign actor is more likely to use compromised hardware to create service interruptions and general chaos in the event they are attacked by our government, not come put me in a gulag.
The only thing I'm missing right now that would be a nice to have is a wifi card so I can ditch my access point. My hardware isn't open source by any means, but my reliance on non-free networking code is minimal.
I don't think the hardware matters so much as the firmware, which is solved by installing OpenWRT on anything that supports it.
If wireless security is the concern, maybe other people here know better but I don't believe anything convenient will be "secure" in the strongest sense of the word.
FCC maintains a list of equipment and services (Covered List) that have been determined to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security.." FCC Updates Covered List to Include Foreign-Made Consumer Routers..
I disagree with the FCC. Banning "China routers" will not meaningfully increase security. Actual security has no correlation with country of manufacture.
This whole comment thread is a bit of a dumpster fire of opinions however we at Supernetworks have been working on the wifi security problem for a long time and we have a lot to say about it.
Router manufacturers competing into involution that ship RCE (much of which is triggerable from a web page) have created a substantial risk to consumers, in this case with a lens on the US market. The events of the FCC are not in isolation and have to do with not being able to boot actors out of many critical infrastructure networks. You can follow along with CISA on the various alerting that they do. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories
We tackle hardware & software and prioritized network isolation as the first thing to resolve. We have tons on our blog and page about network security and have open source software.
Supernetworks -- ill update. Our initial comment got moderated for too much self promotion so also apologies there and again for anyone who is offended
To me, this is a deeply dangerous situation for the state & for the population, where it is nearly impossible for consumers and businesses to purchase gear that they can secure. Where we are at the mercy of what is on the market, and no actual securing of our own can occur.
The FCC claimed in 2015 they were not trying to forbid open source systems, but the additional compliance demands they have made unsupportable unsecurable devices the default state: the FCC mandated companies make sure the users dont have freedom, make sure the wifi performance is locked down, and the most obvious path to that end is to just lock out the user entirely. Open source isn't outlawed, but the FCC turned a good working amazing open source movement into something that is incredibly rare and hard to do. The FCC assurances (https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/11/free-router-software-n...) have not proven true (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11122966): everything has gotten worse for security & availability (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11122966).
Device that connects multiple networks? Layer 3 of the OSI model? Consumer ones tend to have more than that, but the more specific definition would work fine.
Yeah conceivably you could use this to ban any network device that is capable of routing between interfaces, so lots of switches with new firmware could do it, often terribly, as well as PCs with multiple interfaces. But its probably going to involve intention.
If multiple network interfaces defines a router, then every cell phone is one, because every cell phone has a cellular and Wifi interface, and is a router in hotspot mode. Three interfaces if you count USB which can also be a network interface (hotspot works over USB in both Windows and Linux) and four if Bluetooth PAN is still a thing.
Does the router ban really only pertain to consumer-grade networking devices?
> For the purpose of this determination, the term “Routers” is defined by National Institute of Science and Technology’s Internal Report 8425A to include consumer-grade networking devices that are primarily intended for residential use and can be installed by the customer. Routers forward data packets, most commonly Internet Protocol (IP) packets, between networked systems. ¹
> A “consumer-grade router” is a router intended for residential use and can be installed by the customer. Routers forward data packets, most commonly Internet Protocol (IP) packets, between networked systems. Throughout this document, the term “router” is used as a shorthand for “consumer-grade router.” ²
There doesn't seem to be a general ban for foreign-made professional routers, just for some Chinese manufacturers, right³?
Oh, and what does "produced by foreign countries" even mean? I couldn't find any definition. Is this meant to be the country of final assembly? Would importing a Chinese router and the flashing the firmware in the USA be sufficient to be exempt? Where is the line drawn usually?
If you actually read the notice, it exempts models that have been approved. So this just seems to require approvals by DOH or DHS ,": Routers^ produced in a foreign country, except routers which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS." I take this to mean it is just adding security approvals for this type of thing to DOw and DHS. It is not a ban of all future models. It's just saying explicitly that instead of having to review models already in the market and determine that they should be removed because of nation state or other security concerns they are reviewing them before they go to market. Would be nice if people actually read it instead of hyperventilating.
It's fine to have a reaction. It just rhat a lot of the comments totally ignored this this caveat. So basically, as I read it by default, they're banned unless approved, which is pretty much what all regulation does anyway, isn't it.
Especially since the announcement provides no information about how the DoD or DHS will be evaluating what to approve, and it's unlikely that they have the resources to do any meaningful security evaluation on that many products.
The DOH and DOW have a lot of resources. And I would guess the DOW has a lot of intelligence resources and most likely the DOH also I mean it is their job to keep the homeland safe. But I would agree. It probably will involve a lot of marshaling of those resources and reorganization. But who's to say they haven't done that already. My general point is that the conversation in this thread completely ignores that this is an imposition of a different regulatory scheme, not a banning. And actually it's in favor of enforcing more security on routers which everybody has been screaming for for years.
Please avoid low-substance, self-promotional comments like this on HN. It's OK to mention your own product/service occasionally, but only if it's in context and as a part of a comment that makes a substantive, insightful contribution to the discussion.
Also, we recommend using a username that seems human, rather than being based on a company/brand name, otherwise it seems like you are here primarily for promotional purposes rather than curious conversation. You can email us to change the username if you'd like – hn@ycombinator.com.
Thanks Tom. This whole comment thread is a bit of a dumpster fire of opinions however we have been working on the wifi security problem for a long time and we have a lot to say about it. Router manufacturers competing into involution that ship RCE (much of which is triggerable from a web page) have created a substantial risk to consumers, in this case with a lens on the US market. We tackle hardware & software and prioritized network isolation as the first thing to resolve. We have tons on our blog and page about network security and have open source software.
> however we have been working on the wifi security problem for a long time and we have a lot to say about it
Great, please share it with us! If what you've said is true, the kind of comment you're uniquely qualified to share is the very thing the thread most needs.
Right; about 20 comments over nearly three years, and nothing substantive in the current thread.
The whole point I'm trying to make is that you're qualified to make a substantive comment in the current thread and instead you've just posted a low-substance promotional comment.
What the fuck?! I did not sign up to live in some third world shithole where I can't get first-world networking equipment. I do not want some piece of shit closed-source proprietary netgear ameritrash. FUCK! Give me back my god damn chinese routers!
Chinese citizens have more computing freedom than American citizens at this point. What the fuck happened to the land of the free?
I doubt anything will be pulled from the market. This is instead notice to the companies that now is the time for a donation to the administration’s ballroom.
Right now, the way this is currently worded, every single foreign-made consumer router has already been pulled from the market, and has to request permission to be reintroduced. The only consumer routers not currently affected are those that are either already purchased (some good, but won't last forever) or are American-made (overpriced, underpowered dogshit)
From the news release "What does this mean?" section: "This update to the Covered List does not prohibit the import, sale, or use of any existing device models the FCC previously authorized."
So no, this does not pull all existing routers off the market. Anything that already got FCC approval remains approved and new stock may be imported and sold.
Manufacturers have never had to care about security because no Gov agency would ever mandate secure firmware. This includes the FCC which license their devices and the FTC who (until recently) had the direct mandate to protect consumers.
Our most recent step backward was to gut those agencies of any ability to provide consumer oversight. All they they can do now is craft protectionist policies that favor campaign donors.
The US has a bazillion devices with crap security because we set ourselves up for this.
The problem is that "secure firmware" is a relativistic statement. You ship something with no known bugs and then someone finds one.
What you need is not a government mandate for infallibility, it's updates. But then vendors want to stop issuing them after 3 years, meanwhile many consumers will keep using the device for 15. And "require longer support" doesn't fix it because many of the vendors will go out of business.
What you need is the ability for consumers to replace the firmware.
That solves the problem in three ways. First, when the company goes out of business you can still put a supported third party firmware on the device. Second, you can do that immediately, because the open source firmwares have a better security record than the OEMs to begin with. And third, then the device is running a widely used open source firmware instead of a custom device-specific proprietary black box, which makes it easier for the government or anyone else who is so inclined to find vulnerabilities and patch them.
Tough shit. You provide updates for the mandated amount of time, or you lose access to the market. No warnings, you're just done.
> And "require longer support" doesn't fix it because many of the vendors will go out of business.
Source code escrow plus a bond. The bond is set at a level where a third party can pay engineers to maintain the software and distribute updates for the remainder of the mandated support period. And as time passes with documented active support, the bond requirements for that device go down until the end of the support period.
Requiring that the customer be allowed to replace the firmware is essential, I agree, but not for this reason. That requirement, by itself, just externalizes the support costs onto open source communities. Companies that sell this sort of hardware need to put up the resources, up front, irrevocably, to ensure the cost of software maintenance is covered for the entire period.
Personally I don't buy consumer router hardware that I can't immediately flash OpenWRT on, but that option is not suitable for the general public.
How does one ensure the support for the devices is funded?
Which is not a real issue in practice. It's like arguing that warranty doesn't matter because the vendor might go out of business.
I don't think that's enough. Most people aren't going to replace the firmware on their device with an open source replacement made by someone else. Now if the firmware was required to be open source, and automatic updates could be seamlessly switched over to a non-profit or government agency in the event of the company going out of business, you might have something. But there would be a lot of details to work out.
What they're actually trying to do is obsolete the devices faster because then they won't add new protocols or other software-only features to older devices so you have to buy a new one, or only expose features in more expensive models that the less expensive hardware would also be capable of doing. Which is all the more reason for us to not have that.
And if they were required to allow anyone to replace the firmware then you would get companies reflashing and selling them that way from the store because the free firmware has more advertisable features. There's a reason you can go to major PC OEMs and pick between Windows, Linux and "don't even install one" and the reason is that if you give customers a choice, they generally don't want their software to be made by the OEM.
Anyhow, this is a common enough practice. Many companies that provide infrastructure type software and sell to Fortune 500 companies often have a clause whereby they deliver their software to their customers if the shut down.
And you can't wait until after they're dead to have them do something. By then they're gone or judgment proof because they're already bankrupt. Especially when you're talking about companies that aren't in the jurisdiction because you can't even make them do anything when they're already not shipping products to you anymore. It has to be from Day 1.
There was a promising design from Azure Sphere for 10 years of IoT device Linux security updates from Microsoft, even if the IoT vendor went out of business. This required a hardware design to isolate vendor userspace code from device security code, so they could be updated independently. Could be resurrected as open standard with FRAND licensing.
A decade of security updates for routers would require stable isolation between low-level device security and IoT vendor userspace. In Sphere, the business model for 10 years of paid updates was backed by hardware isolation. Anyone know why it didn't get market traction? There was a dev board, but no products shipped.
> That solves the problem in three ways.
That alleviates the problem, but definitely doesn't solve it. Updates are still required, and most people will never update devices they don't directly interact with.
Enterprise must be able to pay for support for as long as they use devices. Solved.
I can only think of requiring the devices to be serviceable, as you say. The absolute only way I can think of charging the consumers, ie the owners, is to charge a tax on internet connections. Then the government would pay somehow vulnerability hunters working along patchers, who can oversee each other.
Consumers are tricky: if you include support in the sale price, the company will grab the money and run in 3 or 5 years; and some companies will sell cheaper because they know they won't provide support.
The problem is not that people need a free meal. The problem is that people need the ability to eat some other food when the OEM's restaurant is closed or unsatisfactory.
Who ensures the maintainers for these routers are incentivized to do this competently and in a timely fashion?
You haven’t answered these key questions, which are equally or more important than whether a community firmware can be applied.
You managed to say that with a straight face!
Let's keep this ... non partisan. You might recall that many vendors have decided to embed static creds in firmware and only bother patch them out when caught out.
How on earth is embedded creds in any way: "no known bugs"?
I think we are on the same side (absolutely) but please don't allow the buggers any credibility!
You misunderstand how organizational knowledge works. You see, it doesn't.
Some embeds the credentials, someone else ships the product. The first person doesn't even necessarily still work there at that point.
Remember that time NASA sent a Mars orbiter to Mars and then immediately crashed it because some of them were using pounds and the others newtons? Literally rocket scientists.
The best we know how to do here is to keep the incentives aligned so the people who suffer the consequences of something can do something about it. And in this case the people who suffer the consequences are the consumers, not the company that may have already ceased to exist, so we need to give the consumers a good way to fix it.
No it isn't, software formally verified to EAL7 is guaranteed to be secure.
Then what's KPTI etc.?
> which also needs to be formally verified for a secure system.
Now we just need a correct and complete theory of quantum mechanics and to do something about that Heisenberg thing.
In general formal proofs tell you if something is true given a stipulated set of assumptions. They don't tell you if one of the stipulated assumptions is wrong or can be caused to be wrong on purpose by doing something nobody had previously known to be possible.
Plenty of consumer-grade devices have had very lax security settings or backdoors baked in for purposes of “troubleshooting” and recovery assistance. It’s never been limited to foreign-made devices.
Security has never been part of the review process. The only time any agency has really cared is when encryption is involved, and that’s just been the FBI wanting it to be neutered so they can have their own backdoors.
The FCC licenses devices to the extent that devices can cause spurious transmissions in the radio spectrum. It’s not a general consumer protection agency. Computer security also is outside the mandate of the FTC, which exists to protect consumers from anticompetitive conduct and unfair business practices, not crappy products.
Sounds like it does to me. Also you're forgetting the part where the FTC under a prior administration either banned DLINK from selling in the US or heavily fined them for selling routers in the US that they knew were running insecure, buggy firmware.
(both quotes were taken verbatim from first, Netgear's US website, and secondly the Bureau of Consumer Protections' section of the FTC's website)
Not that any consumer router is super nice and safe, honestly, you're better off making your own these days.
Sorry but this is merely a convenient excuse. Source: I have hard evidence of a Chinese IoT device where crap security practices were later leveraged by the same company to inject exploit code. It's called plausible deniability and it's foolish to tell me it's a coincidence.
You're not going to convince me that a foreign state actor pressuring a company to include a backdoor wouldn't disguise it as a "whoopsie, our crap code lol" as opposed to adding in the open with a disclaimer on it.
It's all closed source firmware. Even the GPL packages from most consumer router vendors are loaded with binary blobs. Tell me I should trust it.
(That is not to say that the FCC change will move the needle on the underlying issue of router security; as some of the ancestor comments have said, lax security practices are common industry-wide, irrespective of country of development/manufacture.)
[1]: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa...
Oh, sweet summer child. Disclaiming these possible avenues of liability is the main goal of clickwrap "terms of service".
No, I don't have it but you may check with Santa Claus.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1389
> Producers of consumer-grade routers that receive Conditional Approval from DoW or DHS can continue to receive FCC equipment authorizations.
In other words, foreign-made consumer routers are banned by default. But if you are a manufacturer, you can apply to get unbanned ("Conditional Approval").
In the FAQ (https://www.fcc.gov/faqs-recent-updates-fcc-covered-list-reg...), they even include guidance on how to apply: https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/Guidance-for-Conditi...
If you (a manufacturer) apply, they want information regarding corporate location, jursidiction, and ownership. They want a bill of materials with country of origin and a justification for why any foreign-sourced components can't be domestic. They want information about who provides software and updates. And they want to hear your plan to increase US domestic manufacturing and progress toward that goal.
So, foreign-made consumer routers can still be sold, but they are going to look at them with a fine-tooth comb, and they are going to use FCC approval as leverage to try to increase domestic manufacturing.
That is not what's going to happen. What's going to happen is that anyone coughing up payola to the current executive in chief's people will get approved, and anyone that doesn't will remain blocked. This practice is currently widespread, in the form of tariffs.
Also, the biggest benefactors of payola aren't the politicians, it's the rent seekers, that is the businesses already in place that want to prevent competition. Because of this, they usually directly contribute to the politicians that promise to restrict the path to doing business.
For example, if you want a newest-generation extremely-efficient air conditioner in the US, you won't be able to buy it and even if you could, you wouldn't be able to get anyone to install it. Any given model of air conditioners needs to be on an approved list to be sold in the US, and the installer needs to be on an approved list, too. This means that by the time an air conditioner makes it onto the list, it's already old. Also, installers can require you buy it from them, and almost all do, so by the time time an installer on the list has it for sale, it's even older than that. Ironically this is all enabled by the EPA, on the auspices that they are ensuring that it's energy inefficient, when in reality they are preserving the market for the older, more expensive, and inefficient models.
The old payola model. This new model encompasses the old one and adds a neat layer of outright politician bribery on top.
Dario (CEO of Anthropic) said the DoW contract violations and threats were direct retaliation for not paying Trump "campaign" money. Later, he was forced to apologize for speaking the truth.
Wow NGL this sounds great if you ignore the reality that it'll be used as a partisan backdoor to enriching the administration.
You're assuming a non-partisan technocratic process, which this administration has amply shown is neither capable nor willing to provide. This requirement becomes another opportunity for Pay-to-Play, either in cash or quid pro quo, to the government directly (see, e.g., NVidia and AMD export allowances) or to Trump's inner circle (see, e.g., crypto venture regulation, merger approvals).
People who care about the problems of digital security are not going to lean into the idea of simply banning devices based on where they were manufactured. Rather they would work at general standards and solutions to actually solve the problems - things like untying the markets for hardware/firmware/services, requiring firmware source escrow, mandating LAN protocols and controllers so every single IoT device isn't backhauling to its own mothership, and so on.
Likewise people who care about domestic manufacturing first and foremost are not going to champion applying steep blanket tariffs two decades after all of that industry has already left, or using regulatory agencies to shake down manufacturers for unrelated concessions.
No, of course I'm not assuming that. That's not the administration's pattern of behavior, so it would be a crazy assumption.
I agree it'll be abused. I just didn't feel it necessary to state the obvious.
The OpenWRT One [1] sponsored by the Software Conservancy [2] and manufactured by Banana Pi [3] works lovely.
[1] https://openwrt.org/toh/openwrt/one
[2] https://sfconservancy.org/activities/openwrt-one.html
[3] https://docs.banana-pi.org/en/OpenWRT-One/BananaPi_OpenWRT-O...
If the software is an important differentiator (arguably, it is for things like Ubiquiti, but clearly it is not for most consumer routers), then release the patches under the Business Source License with a 3-5 year sunset back to BSD / Apache / GPL.
The difficulty of installing OpenWRT or Linux in general on hardware comes from that hardware not being documented, or not having straightforward APIs like BIOS/EFI.
Or for some devices, community distributions that dubiously remix manufacturer-supplied binaries are available. But we generally see that as soon as the manufacturer stops their updates, the community versions start lagging behind as well.
Self ownership and full 'right to repair' has carve-outs in the FCC's regulations in the name of limiting unintentional broadcasting/radiation. Maybe a challenge to those would survive in the post-Chevron environment. I wouldn't expect any Congress in the last 25 years to pass a law which would go against the incumbent telecom lobbyist interests though, and I'd expect such a hole if it did hit case law, to get 'patched' fairly quickly.
About the only way to really solve that would be to embarrass vendors enough to open their moats.
(To be clear, I don't think that's good enough; at a minimum I think there should be a wifi card that does refuse modifications and a main application processor that is 100% user controlled so that they can actually fix problems without needing the vendor to help, but I think it's useful to point out that auditing code doesn't require being able to install it)
Trusted, qualified independent experts: Ala Underwriters Laboratories.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkswagen_emissions_scandal
Some trust has to be created through testing standards and the law, but generally we do believe what the label says in day to day life.
Detection of the car being on a rolling road, special button combos that trigger the emissions testing map, etc
Maybe trusted community of people could do it for everyone, but there's currently all kinds of potential legal trouble brewing in that approach. Complete and public reverse engineering of every aspect of any device would have to be made completely legal, so that people could freely publish all artifacts extracted from a device and produced during reverse engineering and collaborate on them without any fear of repercussions. Also HW manufacturers would have to be prohibited from NDAing documentation for SoCs, etc.
Side benefit would be that this would also serve as a documentation for freeing the device and developing alternative firmwares with modernized sw/reduced attack surface.
The FCC's power just got substantially nerfed, and "we've decided to slow lane all foreign-made routers" feels like that may have been beaten on the old, higher, standard. Let alone the new one that gives the FCC almost no power.
Are there even consumer-grade routers that are produced in the USA...?
> As outlined below, today’s action does not impact a consumer’s continued use of routers they previously acquired. Nor does it prevent retailers from continuing to sell, import, or market router models approved previously through the FCC’s equipment authorization process. By operation of the FCC’s Covered List rules, the restrictions imposed today apply to new device models.
I’m sure plenty of US factories are capable of importing boxes that look like routers but are actually just switches (because the router firmware is missing) and re-flashing them here…
Starlink?
If companies market the devices as something other than "routers" then consumers will not buy them for routing duty.
(Meanwhile, the non-average people who want to use general-purpose computers as homespun router/NAS/do-all boxes are already aware of how this all works...and many of us have been doing it this way for decades. (Often, this happens alongside dedicated access points that do have good wifi radios.))
I have roommates who are engineers and I had to explain to them the difference between Wi-fi access point and LAN when I replaces our wireless router with a router + 3 APs.
So start your own company called usa router co, and sell some random arm board with a preinstalled router image... the end user won't know the difference.
And superficially, it sounds like a straight-forward thing for me or anyone else to do here in the states, but things get murky quickly: What differentiates a foreign-made router from a US-made router?
Can I get some flunky push the button in his studio apartment in Idaho to flash open (but globally-sourced!) firmware onto some boxes from Alibaba (in exchange for startup promises) and call that good enough?
Do I have to spin up the boards here in the States? And the ICs, too? How about the passive jelly-bean parts like the capacitors and resistors and the antennas?
What of the rest of the device? Like, things such as the housing, the packaging, the power supply, and the included ethernet cable: Do I need to source those from domestic US production or is it OK if they're foreign-made components?
Do I have to produce the software in the States? (If so, Linux is right out.)
Where is the line drawn? How is the line shaped?
Numerous papers showing the ability to easily map indoors areas with WiFi (including occupancy) it’s a liability.
There will be excuses “tariffs” etc but I heard a few have gotten calls from three letter agencies coyly telling you to improve your systems.
It’s a chance to refresh the product line! (of course at the worst time when mem prices are bleed you dry high)
The US didn’t make a space force to please the ego, it was likely to occur eventually. They aren’t spending all their time wargaming a moon invasion lol
Logistically, hacking tons of different model routers is not feasible. It would be more useful to yank the power grid.. which can be accomplished with missiles or software.
I can’t think of a complete start to finish, OS to mosfets, computer that is 100% manufactured in the United States.
I switched away from Omada to Ubiquiti, because of TP Link’s problems.
[0] https://mono.si/
The fact that they haven't updated that webpage with new information since October 1st 2025 seems to indicate bad news...
Shortly put, they're going through hardware startup woes but will probably make it out the other end just fine.
... at the same time, I don't think I'd send $100 to a site with no contact/ownership/company info to begin with.
Personally, I don't make the distinction between foreign and domestically produced routers in America. In fact, I trust foreign produced routers more because the likelihood that they can act upon their surveillance is significantly lower than the current American regime's oppressive and malicious tactics. Therefore, open source routers provides enough transparency to effectively eliminate spyware threats from all angles while being compliant.
I'm especially excited about the Banana Pi because of the transparency and potential of modular upgrades. Whenever there's a network issue, I have to consider whether the manufacturer (American or not) is doing something nefarious. With a Pi based router, I have much more peace of mind with network debugging issues.
The only thing I'm missing right now that would be a nice to have is a wifi card so I can ditch my access point. My hardware isn't open source by any means, but my reliance on non-free networking code is minimal.
If wireless security is the concern, maybe other people here know better but I don't believe anything convenient will be "secure" in the strongest sense of the word.
Router manufacturers competing into involution that ship RCE (much of which is triggerable from a web page) have created a substantial risk to consumers, in this case with a lens on the US market. The events of the FCC are not in isolation and have to do with not being able to boot actors out of many critical infrastructure networks. You can follow along with CISA on the various alerting that they do. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories
We tackle hardware & software and prioritized network isolation as the first thing to resolve. We have tons on our blog and page about network security and have open source software.
And suggested a mod should read comment history: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47497296
But largely thanks to FCC demands, the list of router hardware that can run open source operating systems such as OpenWRT has dwindled to a trickle. There's very precious few wifi 7 / BE systems available, and only a few wifi 6! it's ghastly. https://toh.openwrt.org/?features=wifi_be https://toh.openwrt.org/?features=wifi_ax
To me, this is a deeply dangerous situation for the state & for the population, where it is nearly impossible for consumers and businesses to purchase gear that they can secure. Where we are at the mercy of what is on the market, and no actual securing of our own can occur.
The FCC claimed in 2015 they were not trying to forbid open source systems, but the additional compliance demands they have made unsupportable unsecurable devices the default state: the FCC mandated companies make sure the users dont have freedom, make sure the wifi performance is locked down, and the most obvious path to that end is to just lock out the user entirely. Open source isn't outlawed, but the FCC turned a good working amazing open source movement into something that is incredibly rare and hard to do. The FCC assurances (https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/11/free-router-software-n...) have not proven true (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11122966): everything has gotten worse for security & availability (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11122966).
Really, do they have a definition?
...which in turn refers to https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2024/NIST.IR.8425A.pdf
Yeah conceivably you could use this to ban any network device that is capable of routing between interfaces, so lots of switches with new firmware could do it, often terribly, as well as PCs with multiple interfaces. But its probably going to involve intention.
If Apple can make a Neo laptop out of phone parts, they could make a US Airport router out of US mini PC parts.
(edit: and RAM!)
(edit: and NOT multiple video outputs!!)
(edit: but it's not considered a consumer grade router, that's for sure!)
> For the purpose of this determination, the term “Routers” is defined by National Institute of Science and Technology’s Internal Report 8425A to include consumer-grade networking devices that are primarily intended for residential use and can be installed by the customer. Routers forward data packets, most commonly Internet Protocol (IP) packets, between networked systems. ¹
> A “consumer-grade router” is a router intended for residential use and can be installed by the customer. Routers forward data packets, most commonly Internet Protocol (IP) packets, between networked systems. Throughout this document, the term “router” is used as a shorthand for “consumer-grade router.” ²
There doesn't seem to be a general ban for foreign-made professional routers, just for some Chinese manufacturers, right³?
Oh, and what does "produced by foreign countries" even mean? I couldn't find any definition. Is this meant to be the country of final assembly? Would importing a Chinese router and the flashing the firmware in the USA be sufficient to be exempt? Where is the line drawn usually?
¹) https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/NSD-Routers0326.pdf
²) https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2024/NIST.IR.8425A.pdf
³) https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist
Is this just another mass surveillance operation?
Also, we recommend using a username that seems human, rather than being based on a company/brand name, otherwise it seems like you are here primarily for promotional purposes rather than curious conversation. You can email us to change the username if you'd like – hn@ycombinator.com.
Great, please share it with us! If what you've said is true, the kind of comment you're uniquely qualified to share is the very thing the thread most needs.
The whole point I'm trying to make is that you're qualified to make a substantive comment in the current thread and instead you've just posted a low-substance promotional comment.
Chinese citizens have more computing freedom than American citizens at this point. What the fuck happened to the land of the free?
So no, this does not pull all existing routers off the market. Anything that already got FCC approval remains approved and new stock may be imported and sold.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1389
the router sniffed plaintext http to grab HTTP User agents to put them into a curl bash command line string. Nice RCE from the browser.